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THE PLIGHT OF GEORGIA: RUSSIAN
OCCUPATION AND THE ENERGY
CHARTER TREATY
INTRODUCTION
he territorial and economic integrity of the country of
Georgia was permanently compromised in 2008 following
the Five-Day War in the South Ossetia region. The separatist
territory of South Ossetia fractured its relationship with Geor-
gia by allowing Russian troops to enter the region and by accept-
ing the offer to join the Russian Federation, uniting Ossetia ter-
ritories.
1
Georgia, which has long fought to gain economic and
territorial separation from Russia, finds itself again threatened
with the possibility of another takeover.
2
Georgia’s continued at-
tempts to improve its infrastructure and grow its trade relation-
ship with the West, in particular the European Union, have be-
come strained over this conflict, and the relationship between
Georgia and Russia continues to fracture.
3
Russia maintains a
military occupation of South Ossetia, frequently redrawing
boundary lines further into Georgia, most recently reaching
within one kilometer of the main road in Georgia and seizing a
section of the Baku-Supsa pipeline.
4
This movement has caused
insecurity in gas transfers to Europe and within the nation it-
self.
5
The cultivation of a stronger relationship with Europe and
the United States has done little to help Georgia as the West has
refused to become actively involved in the territorial conflict.
6
Russia’s declaration and recognition of two separatist regions
within Georgia as independent nations has allowed Russia to
1. Interfax, Eighty Percent Vote for Renaming S. Ossetia State of Alania at
Referendum – Central Elections Commission, REGIONAL BUS. NEWS (Apr. 12,
2017).
2. DONALDRAYFIELD, EDGE OFEMPIRES 399 (Reaktion Books 2006).
3. Georgia, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britan-
nica.com/place/Georgia/Cultural-life (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) [hereinafter
Georgia Life].
4. Georgia Profile – Timeline, BBC (May 18, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17303471 [hereinafter Georgia Pro-
file]. Taras Nazarenko, Russian Seizure of Georgian Pipeline Has Dangerous
Implications, EURACTIV (July 23, 2015), https://www.euractiv.com/section/en-
ergy/opinion/russian-seizure-of-georgian-pipeline-has-dangerous-implica-
tions/.
5. See Georgia Profile – Timeline, supra note 4; Nazarenko, supra note 4.
6. See Georgia Profile – Timeline, supra note 4; Nazarenko, supra note 4.
T
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usurp Georgian territory under the guise of protecting and as-
sisting newly independent territories. Russia offered military
support and the issuance of Russian passports to accomplish this
land seizure.
7
This practice has created human rights crises and
affects Georgia’s natural resource and pipeline control.
8
Russia’s
interference in the region has caused the European Union to be-
come nervous due to the former’s proximity and the threat that
the Russians pose to the pipeline running through Georgia. De-
spite this Russian land grab’s jeopardizing of European Union
security, however, noWestern powers have intervened in the sit-
uation.
9
Apart from the Tagliavini report,
10
since the 2008
Russo-Georgian War, the European Union has refrained from
speaking out against the Russian occupation of Georgia.
11
This
approach to the current situation endangers the natural re-
sources, economic security, and integrity of Georgia and puts Eu-
rope’s gas security at risk. Russia’s violation of the Energy Char-
ter Treaty (ECT) is not excused by its lack of ratification, due to
the provisional application of the treaty.
12
Furthermore, the In-
ternational Energy Charter (IEC) has not replaced the ECT or
its obligations ensuring the continuing obligations under the
ECT.
The ECT
13
could provide reprieve for Georgia should the coun-
try see continued interference from Russia. The treaty protects
7. Iskra Kirova, Public Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: Russia, Geor-
gia and the EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, USC CENTER PUB. DIPL.
ANNENBERG SCH. 7, 16²17 (2012).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. The Tagliavini Report was an independent Report on the events leading
up to and of the Five-Day War. The Report was named for the leader of the
team, Swiss Diplomat Heidi Tagliavini. While the report stated that Georgia
had indeed fired the first shot in the armed conflict, it was not lost on the team
that Russia had been provoking action prior and took actions violating inter-
national law during the war. See Thomas deWaal, The Still-Topical Tagliavini
Report, CARNEGIE MOSCOW CENTER (Sept. 30, 2015), http://carnegie.ru/com-
mentary/61451. Timothy Heritage, Georgia Started War with Russia: EU-
Backed Report, REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
georgia-russia-report/georgia-started-war-with-russia-eu-backed-report-
idUSTRE58T4MO20090930.
11. Georgia Profile, supra note 4.
12. Matthew Belz, Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty:
Kardassopoulos v. Georgia and Improving Provissional Application in Multi-
lateral Treaties, 22 EMORY INTL L. REV. 727 (2009).
13. See infra note 103.
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energy investments, and through its provisional application pro-
vision, Russia could be accused of violating the protectionist na-
ture of the treaty.
14
The ECT’s purposes to foster investment in
the energy industry and to promote a breakaway from the reli-
ance on the Russian energy giants have been particularly suc-
cessful in Georgia, where the nation has been able to partner
with Azerbaijan to create pipelines and to transfer energy re-
sources to Europe without crossing through Russia.
15
The main
artery, the Baku-Supsa Pipeline, has not yet suffered direct in-
terference by Russia since coming under the territory acquired
by South Ossetia, but British Petroleum (BP),
16
which runs the
pipeline, has not had access to the region since the Five-DayWar
in 2008, creating uncertainty to the true security of the energy
investment.
17
As Russia continues their land grab in the region,
Georgia can utilize obligations under the ECT to hold Russia ac-
countable for illegally seizing Georgian land as it interferes with
their energy industry. Through continued partnership with the
European Union and by fostering stronger relations with the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Georgia may be
able to push Russian forces from the region and regain its terri-
torial and economic integrity.
Part I of this Note will discuss the history of Georgia, its trou-
bled past, and its relationship with the European Union, leading
up to the Five-Day War in 2008 and Russia’s continued move-
ment into Georgian territory. Part I also discusses the strategic
importance of the Baku-Supsa Pipeline to Georgia and why its
continued operation is critical to Georgian infrastructure. Then,
Part II will provide a background and analysis of the treaties in
force between these nations and the European Union. Such trea-
ties as the ECT and the IEC are aimed at protecting investments
in gas transit. The nuances of certain treaty articles and supple-
ments to these treaties provide context under which Russia may
be responsible for usurping strategic territory. Next, Part III will
14. Rafael Leal-Arcas et al., The European Union and its Energy Security
Challenges, 8 J. WORLDENERGY L. & BUS. 291 (2015).
15. Id.
16. BP is one of the world’s leading oil and gas companies. BP at a Glance,
BP, https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/what-we-do/bp-at-a-glance.html
(last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
17. EUWarning over Russia ‘Land Grab’ in South Ossetia Border Row, BBC
(July 16, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33549462 [hereinafter
EU Warning over Land Grab].
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touch on the recent Yukos cases in which the provisional appli-
cation of the ECT was challenged by Russia, which won on an
appeal. While the Yukos cases originally provided the largest ar-
bitration award in history, the challenge by Russia creates a
loophole in which nations may escape obligations under the pro-
visional application. This part of the Note elaborates on the chal-
lenges to Georgia in utilizing this provision for Russian account-
ability. Finally, Part IV of this Note examines potential solutions
available to Georgia to avoid further loss of territory and to
maintain its energy and economic security. These possible solu-
tions include: expanded European Union relations for Georgia
and an enhanced military response provided by NATO or Euro-
pean nations that can provide forces.
I. HISTORY ANDGEORGIA’S PLACE IN EUROPE’S ENERGY TRADE
Georgia has long been a troubled nation, emerging from the
Soviet Union with deep-rooted governmental corruption.
18
While
Georgia was able, through many regime changes, to quiet cor-
ruption and create a policy of governmental integrity, it still
finds itself haunted by its Soviet past and looks to Europe for
security.
A. A Background History of Georgia
Georgia, a former Soviet territory, has a long history of being
at odds with its neighbors over its borders. After spending time
as both a fractured part of the Ottoman Empire and as a British
territory, the country became a recognized independent nation
in 1920;
19
first, through de facto recognition by the Allies and
then by the Russo-Georgian Treaty.
20
Only a year later, the
Georgian nation was incorporated into the Soviet Republic as a
territory.
21
It was under the rule of the Soviet leader, Joseph
Stalin, himself born in Georgia, that the state transitioned from
an agricultural society to an industrial, urban society.
22
While
Georgia was able to maintain its language and literature, the
country was not able to move towards full independence until
18. Georgia Life, supra note 3.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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the 1980s under Mikhail Gorbachev’s rule.
23
After successful
parliamentary elections in October 1990, Georgia declared inde-
pendence on April 9, 1991.
24
During this time, secessionist move-
ments erupted in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were
quelled by Commonwealth of Independent States peacekeep-
ers.
25
It was during this time that the country fell into a period
of severe governmental corruption, the effects of which are still
seen today.
26
Following the Rose Revolution in 2003, the acting administra-
tion was once again confronted with a growing opposition.
27
Mi-
kheil Saakashvili’s
28
government was criticized for human
rights abuses, as well as a growing sense of authoritarianism,
and while he offered to discuss autonomy with the South Ossetia
region in 2005, the region rejected the offer of autonomy and
held its own unofficial referendum.
29
Since that time, conflict in
the region has only intensified, particularly straining Georgia’s
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. Peacekeepers were put in force after the fall of the Soviet Union and
the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States. These peace-
keepers were Russian Troops who worked alongside UN Observer missions.
See Konstantin Korkelia, The CIS Peace-Keeping Operations in the Context of
International Legal Order, N. ATL. TREATY ORG. (1997²1999),
https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/korkelia.pdf.
26. Korkelia, supra note 25. At the time, there was no method for collecting
taxes, and governmental posts were sold to finance the government. Instead of
financing the government or providing infrastructure for electricity and gas
supplies, officials took government funds for themselves. See RAYFIELD, supra
note 2, at 388.
27. Georgia Life, supra note 3. The Rose Revolution was a peaceful uprising
in which Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze was ousted from power by
Mikheil Saakashvili’s western leaning opposition. Following the revolution,
new elections were held, in which Saakashvili won 96 percent of the vote. See
RAYFIELD, supra note 2, at 392.
28. Mikheil Saakashvili was president of Georgia from 2004 to 2007 and
again from 2008 to 2013. Saakashvili won his election after ousting President
Shevardnadze by forcing him to flee the parliamentary building and holding
new elections. His tenure as President of Georgia was primarily focused on
keeping Georgia together territorially, leading to frequent conflicts with Rus-
sia. Saakashvili’s term as President was marred with human rights abuse
claims and ended when a video of Georgian prison guards abusing prisoners
surfaced. Mikheil Saakasvili, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA (Dec. 17, 2018),
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mikheil-Saakashvili.
29. Georgia Life, supra note 3.
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relationship with Russia, which has provided support to sepa-
ratists in the South Ossetia region.
30
In August 2008, the conflict
climaxed with Georgian forces engaging with separatists and
Russia claiming to defend Russian citizens within the territory
by moving forces into Georgia.
31
The Five-Day War killed hundreds and forced thousands of
Georgian refugees into shelters.
32
For many Georgians, the loss
of territory and the invasion of the Russian military had muffled
all that had been achieved in the nation since the Rose Revolu-
tion.
33
The military engagement by Russia “bypassed estab-
lished channels of conflict resolution and unilaterally [moved to]
change the boundaries of another United Nations member
state.”
34
Russia had become particularly bold in the years lead-
ing up to the Five-Day War, invading and making its military
presence known throughout regions that are associated with the
European Union and NATO.
35
This action was received poorly
by the international community and strained U.S.-Russian rela-
tions to the lowest point since the Cold War.
36
After brokering a
French-executed cease-fire only five days into armed conflict, the
Abkhazia
37
and SouthOssetia regions are unlikely to ever return
to full Georgian control.
38
Despite Georgia’s losing approxi-
mately one-fifth of its territory, a major issue is that the acts of
intervention taken by Russia were in full disregard for multilat-
eral institutions, like the United Nations Security Council or the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and agree-
ments thereunder.
39
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Charles King, The Five Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia
Crisis, FOREIGN AFF. (Nov²Dec. 2008), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/arti-
cles/russia-fsu/2008-11-01/five-day-war.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Abkhazia is another breakaway region in Georgia, located in the north-
west corner of the country. While the location is less strategic than that of
South Ossetia, it is also backed by Russia and has been a source of conflict for
the nations. Georgia Life, supra note 3.
38. King, supra note 32.
39. Id. The Commonwealth of Independent States was created following the
fall of the Soviet Union to facilitate coordination of policies among the former
Soviet states. Commonwealth of Independent States, ENCYCLOPEDIA
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Following the Five-Day War, Georgia withdrew from the Com-
monwealth of Independent States, calling on other nations in the
region to do the same.
40
Since 2008, in the aftermath of the Five-
Day War, Georgia has continued pressing forward with a policy
to quell governmental corruption, ushering in a new era with the
Georgian Dream Coalition
41
in 2014, leading to the Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU.
42
Russia maintains its occupation in the Georgian Region of
South Ossetia today, moving the border further into Georgian
territory. Since 2015, when Russia signed an “alliance and inte-
gration” treaty with South Ossetia, the Russian military has re-
mained in the region and has moved the internal border more
than 1.5 kilometers further into the country.
43
This has created
additional concerns in the area, as the new border threatens to
cut off the main road in the nation and severs a section of the
Baku-Supsa Pipeline from Georgian control.
44
This main road
runs east to west, and if cut off by Russian ¶peacekeepers,’ would
cause a crisis for Georgia, as it continues to focus on building its
infrastructure.
45
It does not appear, however, that Georgia will
be able to reacquire South Ossetia anytime soon.
46
In April 2017,
the region held a referendum to change its name to the ¶State of
Alania,’ aligning itself with its North Ossetia neighbors in Rus-
sia and preparing to join the Russian Federation.
47
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Commonwealth-of-Independ-
ent-States (last visited June 10, 2019).
40. Georgia Life, supra note 3.
41. The Georgian Dream Coalition aimed to integrate Georgia into more Eu-
ropean and American institutions at the beginning of their time in office. The
Georgian Dream Coalition, INDEP. DIPLOMAT, https://independentdiplo-
mat.org/project/the-georgian-dream-coalition/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
42. Georgia Life, supra note 3. The DCFTA aims to help integrate the Geor-
gian economy with the European economy as an association agreement, solid-
ifying the partnership as Georgia’s most important trading partner. EU-
Georgia Trade Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), EUR.
COMM’N, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153435.pdf
(last visited June 10, 2019).
43. Georgia Profile, supra note 4.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Interfax, supra note 1.
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B. A History of the European Union and its Relationship with
Georgia
The original aim of the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), the forerunner to the European Union, was the im-
proved movement of coal and steel throughout Europe.
48
The
original six members³France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Neth-
erlands, and Luxembourg³planned to pool their raw materials
in an effort to economically expand, increase employment, create
a higher standard of living through a common market, allow
equal access to sources of production, establish lower prices, and
improve working conditions.
49
The ECSC played a role in gov-
ernment cooperation in commercial policy, drawing up produc-
tion programs that established consumption priorities and de-
termined how resources should be allocated while setting export
levels.
50
The ECSC was successful in its mission to balance the
distribution of resources and production to facilitate restructur-
ing and redevelopment in Europe after World War II.
51
The or-
ganization went through its most significant treaty revision at
the beginning of the 1990s when the Maastricht Treaty estab-
lished the European Union.
52
The Maastricht Treaty established the European Union as
many people understand it today.
53
The European Union
brought together the movement of goods, services, people and
money into a single market in 1993.
54
The European Single Mar-
ket allows for goods and services to be freely transferred
throughout the European Union, including the ability of compa-
nies “to provide services in countries other than the one in which
they are established.”
55
The Maastricht Treaty has provisions
establishing the prohibition of restrictions on imports and ex-
ports between members only; exceptions may exist in the cases
48. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC
Treaty, EUR-LEX, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Axy0022 (last visited Dec. 28, 2017).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Europe Without Frontiers, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-un-
ion/about-eu/history/1990-1999_en (last visited Dec. 28, 2017).
54. Id.
55. The European Single Market, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/growth/single-market_en (last visited Dec. 28, 2017).
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of public morality, public position or security, protection of
health and life of humans, animals or plants, and protection of
industrial and commercial property, but the treaty does not es-
tablish these prohibitions on restrictions for nations outside of
the European Union.
56
The European Union has many valuable partners outside of
its members.
57
These partners sign association agreements to re-
ceive trade and economic benefits from the European Union
without being a member.
58
Georgia is one of the European Un-
ion’s sixteen partner countries that are included in the union’s
European Neighborhood Policy, and more recently, the Eastern
Partnership.
59
The Eastern Partnership helps partner nations to
the European Union work toward a “greater mobility of citizens
and stronger collaboration in a number of sectors, such as
transport, energy and the environment.”
60
Georgia’s benefits as
a partner to the European Union include assistance from the
European Union Monitoring Mission, which has worked since
2008 to monitor boundary lines in Georgia near the region of
South Ossetia.
61
While the European Union’s motivation is to
support Georgia’s territorial integrity, the support also enables
the European Union to address the environmental concerns of
the Black Sea region.
62
Economically, the European Union has
assisted Georgia in fighting corruption, overhauling tax collec-
tion procedures, and opening up the country’s economy to foreign
56. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, EUR-LEX, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12016E/TXT#d1e2283-1-1 (last visited Dec. 28,
2017).
57. See generally The European Single Market, supra note 55 (stating the
importance of free transfer of goods and desire to partner with other nations
in the region).
58. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, supra note 56.
59. Georgia and the EU, EUR. UNION EXTERNAL ACTION, https://eeas.eu-
ropa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/1237/georgia-and-eu_en (last
visited Dec. 28, 2017). The European Neighborhood Policy was initially set up
in 2004 and since being reevaluated in 2015, works to create stabilization, se-
curity and prosperity for countries to the south and east of the European Un-
ion. European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), EUR. UNION EXTERNAL ACTION,
https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/european-neighbourhood-policy-
enp/330/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en (last visited June 10, 2019).
60. European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), supra note 59.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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trade and investment.
63
As a result of the European Union’s
trade agreements with Georgia, this assistance also includes bol-
stering the European Union’s ability to provide oil and gas to its
own economy. In 2015, one of the European Union’s main im-
ports to Georgia was fuel and mining products.
64
While pharma-
ceutical products constituted a larger import³almost 50 percent
of imports overall
65
³the proposition that a country produces its
own gas, yet still needs to import fuel, is particularly baffling.
While the European Union Monitoring Mission to Georgia has
assumed a peace-keeping role to ensure there is no return to
armed hostilities, Georgian territory continues to be usurped by
Russian advances throughout the South Ossetia region and
deeper into Georgia.
66
Trade between the European Union and Georgia primarily fo-
cuses on rebuilding infrastructure throughout the region.
67
The
DCFTA has provided Georgia with the opportunity to gradually
integrate its economywith the European economy.
68
Georgia has
increased its trade with the European Union to more than a
quarter of overall trade in 2015, doubling or tripling certain
product exports, such as hazelnuts, copper and petroleum oils.
69
The further establishment of pipeline initiatives to supply oil to
Europe, without ties to Russia, binds Europe to the outcome of
the current conflict should Russia continue usurping Georgian
territory.
C. The Baku-Supsa Pipeline
The Baku-Supsa pipeline runs from Baku, Azerbaijan,
through Georgia, and into the European market.
70
The pipeline
runs through the central part of the country, resulting in a one-
mile stretch of the pipeline’s falling under control of the Russian-
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. EU Warning over Land Grab, supra note 17.
67. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC
Treaty, supra note 48.
68. EU-Georgia Trade Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA),
supra note 42.
69. Id.
70. Nazarenko, supra note 4.
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backed movement in South Ossetia.
71
The pipeline began oper-
ating in 1999 and provided a reprieve for former Soviet nations
from Russian economic pressure.
72
Pipelines in Georgia have ad-
ditionally created an economic stability that the country strug-
gled to maintain when it first gained independence.
73
By pump-
ing nearly six million tons of gas per year to Europe, Georgia has
expanded tax collection and bolstered its infrastructure.
74
This
is significant for Georgia, as it has historically struggled with
tax collection, resulting in economic harm.
75
Russia’s control of a one-mile stretch of pipeline may seem in-
significant overall, but this stretch can have disastrous effects
on the regions, which are affected by the flow of gas through this
pipeline.
76
These effects include: the deprivation of revenue to
Georgia; Russia’s continued domination and control of the Euro-
pean Union’s gas sources; and the potential for another armed
military conflict in the region should Russia interfere with the
pipeline.
77
Russia’s history of leveraging its control in the oil and gas in-
dustry to pressure Europe to achieve their political goals has
been prevalent since the fall of the Soviet Union.
78
For example,
in 2015, Russia halted gas delivery to Ukraine to pressure the
nation into accepting significant price increases.
79
These price
increases came after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
80
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. RAYFIELD, supra note 2, at 390.
74. Nazarenko, supra note 4.
75. RAYFIELD, supra note 2 at 390.
76. Nazarenko, supra note 4.
77. See id. The Separatists in South Ossetia could start siphoning off gas
from the pipeline which would result in a loss of revenue to the Georgians and
their economy. Fatma Babayeva, Baku-Supsa Pipe’s Contribution to Economic
Development of Azerbaijan, Georgia Highlighted, AZERNEWS (May 16, 2016),
https://www.azernews.az/oil_and_gas/96668.html. Furthermore, Russia could
cut off flow of the pipeline to achieve any further political goals with the Union
and Georgia. Id. Finally, the reemergence of armed conflict in the region could
be a real possibility as the government of Azerbaijan has already articulated
that they will intervene militarily, if necessary, to protect the integrity of their
pipeline. Id.
78. Nazarenko, supra note 4.
79. Andrew Roth, Gazprom Halts Natural Gas Deliveries to Ukraine, N.Y.
TIMES (July 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/business/interna-
tional/gazprom-ukraine-natural-gas-deliveries-russia.html.
80. Id.
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Prior to Russia’s occupation and annexation of Crimea, Russia
allowed Ukraine a $100 USD discount on gas prices per thou-
sand cubic meters in exchange for leasing rights to the base for
the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea.
81
Following annexation,
Russia lowered the discount to $40 USD.
82
Previously, in 2014,
Russia had also cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine over the
conflict in the southeastern region of Ukraine between the
Ukrainian Army and pro-Russian separatists after President
Viktor F. Yanukovych
83
was removed from office.
84
Russia’s standing history of pressuring nations into following
its political agenda makes it evident that Russia could use its
effective control of this section of the Baku-Supsa pipeline to ef-
fect change between the Georgian government and the South
Ossetia Region. This seems likely, due to the Russian govern-
ment’s routine express disapproval over the growing relation-
ship between Georgia and the European Union.
85
In addition,
Russia’s longstanding criticism of NATO adds fuel to the fire in
its disapproval of the Georgian government’s continued march
towards theWest and rejection of Russian policy.
86
The Georgian
government seems to believe that the pipeline will continue to
operate uninterrupted, stating, “Uninterrupted operation of the
pipeline is one of [the] priority issues. . . . [A]ll measures will be
taken for its security.”
87
Russia’s seizure of the pipeline can help
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Viktor F. Yanukovych was President of Ukraine from 2010 until he was
ousted in 2014. Yanukovych was ousted after refusing to sign an association
agreement with the European Union in November 2013. His presidency had
largely been driven by closer relations with the European Union, and the re-
fusal to accept the agreement caused large street protests turning violent in
February 2014. Profile: Ukraine’s Ousted President Viktor Yanukovych, BBC
(Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25182830.
84. Roth, supra note 79.
85. Patrick Smyth, Ossetia to Be Latest Focus of Russia’s Uneasy Relation-
ship with EU, IRISH TIMES (Mar. 11, 2017), https://www.irishtimes.com/opin-
ion/ossetia-to-be-latest-focus-of-russia-s-uneasy-relationship-with-eu-
1.3005536.
86. See id.
87. Georgian Official: Baku-Supsa Pipeline to Operate Uninterruptedly,
AZERI NEWS AGENCY (July 28, 2017), http://en.apa.az/azerbaijan_en-
ergy_and_industry/georgian-official-baku-supsa-pipeline-to-operate-uninter-
ruptedly.html.
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the nation continue to intimidate Georgia.
88
These tactics com-
prise Russia’s best options to influence Georgia in its clash
against South Ossetia.
89
BP,
90
which runs the pipeline, states
that it has not had access to the section of pipeline currently un-
der Russian control since the 2008 War,
91
and while this has not
resulted in a flare-up of tensions, the potential exists.
Despite European Union Foreign Policy Chief Mogherini’s
comments in 2015 that Georgia should avoid provocative steps,
92
avoiding provocative steps could result in Georgia striking a deal
with Russia to keep the pipeline operating properly.
93
Political
analysts suggest that Georgia could simply truck the oil from the
pipeline prior to its entry into occupied territory to its output in
the Black Sea for transport to Europe,
94
but this is not a viable
option. The cost of transferring the oil from the pipeline to the
sea would undoubtedly raise prices and cause delays in deliv-
ery.
95
These issues would likely further strain Georgian economy
and cause tensions between Georgia and Russia to escalate
again.
96
II. TREATIES
The ECT provides the basis for which Georgia has been able to
foster energy investment and infrastructure development.
97
The
IEC and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
provide further context regarding the importance of fostering en-
ergy investments in the region and the tools with which Russia
may be held accountable under the obligations of the ECT.
88. Nazarenko, supra note 4.
89. Id.
90. BP at a Glance, supra note 16.
91. EU Warning over Land Grab, supra note 17.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Nazarenko, supra note 4.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Nazarenko, supra note 4.
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A. Energy Charter Treaty
The ECT
98
arose in 1994 to update and implement the previous
European Energy Charter to express the principles of the Euro-
pean Community to secure an energy supply and provide sus-
tainable economic development.
99
The ECT fostered energy co-
operation in a post-Cold War Eurasia in need of investment to
upgrade an ailing system of pipelines.
100
The European Union
seized the opportunity provided by the fall of the Soviet Union
to enhance its own energy security.
101
The treaty itself is geared
towards protecting the European energy market, and while over
fifty countries signed on, not all ratified the treaty.
102
Russia,
which never ratified the treaty, did provisionally apply it until
2009, pursuant to Article 45, which is entitled “Provisional Ap-
plication.”
103
The provisional application of a treaty is unique, as
treaties generally enter into effect on an effective date³not upon
signature.
104
The provisional application is generally used with
an emergency treaty to expedite implementation on the state
level prior to the treaty entering into force.
105
Moreover, the pro-
visional application of the ECT may be seen as emphasizing the
importance of the treaty itself by creating immediate coopera-
tion (upon signature) and a chance for development in the en-
ergy sector.
106
All signatories to the ECT undertake Article 7, which ad-
dresses transit.
107
Article 7 requires that any dispute over a mat-
ter arising from transit does not give the controlling party the
98. The ECT was created by the powers of Europe to create a level playing
field for energy resource investment throughout Europe and the surrounding
nations. Leal-Arcas et al., supra note 14, at 294.
99. The European Energy Charter, INT’LENERGYCHARTER, http://www.ener-
gycharter.org/process/european-energy-charter-1991/ (last updated June 2,
2015).
100. Leal-Arcas et al., supra note 14, at 301.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. The Energy Charter Treaty art. 45, Dec. 17, 1994, available at https://en-
ergycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECTC-en.pdf [hereinafter
ECT].
104. Belz, supra note 12, at 729.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 750.
107. ECT, supra note 103. Article 7 reads in part:
(1) Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary
measures to facilitate the Transit of Energy Materials and
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right to interrupt or reduce transport.
108
Russia’s refusal to par-
ticipate in further negotiations or talks regarding the ECT re-
Products consistent with the principle of freedom of transit
and without distinction as to the origin, destination or own-
ership of such Energy Materials and Products or discrimina-
tion as to pricing on the basis of such distinctions, and with-
out imposing any unreasonable delays, restrictions or
charges. . . . (3) Each Contracting Party undertakes that its
provisions relating to transport of Energy Materials and
Products and the use of Energy Transport Facilities shall
treat Energy Materials and Products in Transit in no less fa-
vorable a manner than its provisions treat such materials
and products originating in or destined for its own area un-
less an existing international agreement provides otherwise.
(4) In the event that Transit of Energy Materials and Prod-
ucts cannot be achieved on commercial terms by means of En-
ergy Transport Facilities the Contracting Parties shall not
place obstacles in the way of new capacity being established,
except as may be otherwise provided in applicable legislation
which is consistent with paragraph (1). (5) A Contracting
Party through whose Area Energy Materials and Products
may transit shall not be obliged to (a) permit the construction
or modification of Energy Transport Facilities; or (b) permit
new or additional Transit through existing Energy Transport
Facilities, which it demonstrates to the other Contracting
Parties concerned would endanger the security or efficiency
of its energy systems including the security of supply. Con-
tracting Parties shall, subject to paragraphs (6) and (7), se-
cure established flows of Energy Materials and Products to,
from or between the Areas of other Contracting Parties. (6) A
Contracting Party through whose Area EnergyMaterials and
Products transit shall not, in the event of a dispute over any
matter arising from that Transit, interrupt or reduce, permit
any entity subject to its control to interrupt or reduce, or re-
quire any entity subject to its jurisdiction to interrupt or re-
duce the existing flow of Energy Materials and Products prior
to the conclusion of the dispute resolution procedures set out
in paragraph (7), except where this is specifically provided for
in a contract or other agreement governing such Transit or
permitted in accordance with the conciliator’s decision. (7)
[Dispute resolution procedures described in section (6)].
Id. art. 7.
108. Id.
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lates to its denial of being bound by the ECT and its provi-
sions.
109
Russia asserts that it should not be subject to the pro-
visional application, and as recently as 2017, has been able to
defend its contention in the Hague District Court.
110
While the
initial arbitration tribunal gave Yukos
111
reprieve, awarding a
record sum, the analysis the tribunal applied pertaining to the
provisional application of the ECT stated that there was an “all
or nothing” application and as Russia had applied some of the
laws, it was subject to all of them provisionally despite never
formally ratifying the treaty.
112
Upon appeal in the Hague Dis-
trict Court, Russia argued the judgement should be set aside be-
cause it was not subject to the arbitration clause in Article 26 of
the ECT due to its conflicting nature with Russia’s own proce-
dures.
113
Russian law on foreign investments states that “dis-
putes arising from legal relations between foreign investors and
Russia which were predominately public law in nature should
be resolved by Russian courts.”
114
Russia further argued that
while the executive at the time issued a memorandum on the
legal regime of foreign investment under the ECT, this could not
be regarded as law because it was issued by the executive and
merely contemplated the compatibility of the ECT with Russian
law³not specifically Article 26 of the ECT.
115
The Court inter-
preted this information to mean there was no legal basis in Rus-
sian Law for the Arbitration Clause of the ECT. Thus, Russia
was not bound by decisions made under it, setting aside judge-
ments made in the Yukos case.
109. Renewed Confrontation in Georgia, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 17,
2016), https://www.cfr.org/report/renewed-confrontation-georgia.
110. Fenghua Li, The Yukos Cases and the Provisional Application of the En-
ergy Charter Treaty, 6 CAMBRIDGE INT’L L.J. 1 (2016) [hereinafter The Yukos
Cases].
111. Id.; Michael D. Goldhaber, 2015 Arbitration Scorecard, LAW.COM (July
1, 2015), https://www.law.com/almID/1202731093438/.
112. Goldhaber, supra note 111.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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1. Transit Protocol
The Transit Protocol of the ECT was implemented to further
the objectives laid out in Article 7 of the ECT.
116
The objectives
articulated at the Energy Charter Conference in 1998 were “to
ensure secure, efficient, uninterrupted and unimpeded transit;
to promote more efficient use of transit infrastructure; to facili-
tate the construction or modification of transit infrastruc-
ture.”
117
The Agreement of Terms for the Protocol was reached
in 2002, but by 2003, the process of negotiations was suspended
primarily due to outstanding issues concerning primarily Rus-
sia.
118
Provisions on energy transit continue to be a top priority
for the ECT’s contracting parties, despite not ultimately being
able to come to a specific agreement on transit in general.
119
The Transit Protocol, however, could be revived as a strategy
to strengthen Article 7’s objectives.
120
The Transit Protocol
would provide a strict obligation to observe transit agreements,
as well as a strict prohibition on unauthorized taking of energy
material and products.
121
The Protocol would also require transit
tariffs to be non-discriminatory, objective, reasonable, transpar-
ent, and unaffected by market distortions.
122
While the majority
of the contracting parties currently abide by these rules, Russia
does not.
123
Russia and its nationalized energy giants, including
Gazprom, assign tariffs to their gas as they see fit; when a nation
receiving gas from Russia does not comply with price increases
or other demands, it denies access to the gas until that country,
eventually dwindling in supply and in desperate need of gas im-
ports, gives in.
124
116. Transit Protocol, INT’L ENERGY CHARTER, http://www.energychar-
ter.org/what-we-do/trade-and-transit/transit-protocol/ (last visited Dec. 26,
2017).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Andrey A. Konoplyanik, Gas Transit in Eurasia: Transit Issues Between
Russian and the European Union and the Role of the Energy Charter, 27 J.
ENERGY&NAT. RESOURCES L. 445, 486 (2009).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Roth, supra note 79.
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B. The International Energy Charter
The IEC was primarily drafted to “engage in a structured dia-
logue with non-signatories of the European Energy Charter in
order to promote the principles of the Charter and its framework
for cooperation on the Global Scale, [and] to modernize the Eu-
ropean Energy Charter as the basic political declaration of the
Energy Charter Process.”
125
As a twenty-first century solution,
the IEC notably does not include Russia as a signatory and fo-
cuses on access to clean energy and the diversification of energy
sources.
126
1. Arbitration Possibilities available for Dispute Resolutions
Arbitration is required by the ECT for settlement of disputes
between contracting parties by Article 27.
127
Article 27(1) states
that parties must first endeavor to settle disputes through dip-
lomatic channels; however, if that is not successful within a rea-
sonable amount of time, they may submit the matter to an ad
hoc tribunal under Article 27.
128
This provision of the ECT calls
for three arbitrators, one appointed by each contracting party,
and a third, who may not be a national or citizen of a contracting
party to the dispute appointed by the parties to the dispute.
129
If
the contracting parties cannot agree on a non-affiliated arbitra-
tor to serve as president of the tribunal, the Secretary-General
of the Permanent Court of International Arbitration will select
the arbitrator.
130
C. Treaty Interpretation
The VCLT governs how treaties between parties to the conven-
tion are interpreted.
131
It is widely regarded as a codification of
125. See supra note 99.
126. Id.
127. ECT, supra note 103, art. 27.
128. ECT, supra note 103, art. 27.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signatureMay 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT]. The VCLT entered
into force in 1980, applying to treaties commenced and concluded by states.
The VCLT also applies to international organizations. Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/vi-
enna_convention_on_the_law_of_treaties (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
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international law norms applicable to treaties, with some provi-
sions being referred to by the International Court of Justice as
Customary International Law.
132
Both Russia and Georgia are
party to the VCLT; thus, it can be used to interpret a treaty, such
as the ECT, between the two states.
133
The relevant articles for
interpretation in relation to the current threat to the transit pro-
vision of the ECT include Articles 11²17, and Article 25.
134
Arti-
cle 31 of the VCLT states, “A treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.”
135
Article 7 of the ECT concerning transit states
that Contracting Parties shall undertake “necessary measures
to facilitate the Transit of Energy Materials and Products con-
sistent with the principle of freedom of transit . . . and without
imposing any unreasonable delays, restrictions or charges.”
136
These VCLT provisions are tools Georgia can use to interpret
Russia’s obligations under the ECT.
1. Signatory v. Ratification
Article 39 of the ECT states, “This Treaty shall be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval by signatories. Instruments
of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with
the Depositary.”
137
The requirement to approve a treaty via rat-
ification eliminates the ability of the treaty to be in force with
only a signature. With the provisional application, however, the
treaty is in force prior to its ratification or entry into force.
138
This provides particular importance to the signing of a treaty, as
132. Karl Zemanek, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UNITED
NATIONS (2009), http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/vclt/vclt.html.
133. See VCLT, supra note 131.
134. Id. (The relevant provisions address the following: the means of express-
ing consent to be bound by a treaty (Article 11); consent to be bound by a treaty
expressed by signature (Article 12); consent to be bound by a treaty expressed
by an exchange of instruments constituting a treaty (Article 13); consent to be
bound by a treaty expressed by ratification, acceptance or approval (Article 14);
consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by accession (Article 15); the ex-
change or deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or acces-
sion (Article 16); consent to be bound by part of a treaty and the choice of dif-
fering provisions (Article 17); and the provisional application (Article 25)).
135. Id. art. 31.
136. ECT, supra note 103, art. 7.
137. ECT, supra note 103, art 39.
138. Id.
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the provisional application alone binds the country in question
to the obligations of the treaty.
139
2. Provisional Application
Article 45 of the ECT relates specifically to the Provisional Ap-
plication of the Treaty.
140
Not all signatories of the ECT ratified
their acceptance of the Treaty
141
; Russia became a signatory to
the Treaty, but never ratified the Treaty.
142
The provisional ap-
plication of a treaty that is primarily an investment treaty is
unique, as the treaty does not deal with international security
or regulation.
143
This does, however, accomplish the same goal of
requiring nations to implement the provisions of the treaty prior
to its entry into force.
144
Nations were required to implement the
provisions of the treaty until thirty ratifications of the treaty
were acquired (occurring on April 16, 1998), setting it into force.
Additionally, if any nation did not ratify the treaty and did not
explicitly, pursuant to Article 45(1), declare its inability to ac-
cept the provisional application upon signing, it would still be
subject to the provisional application.
145
Russia delivered no
such declaration, and therefore, was required to provisionally
apply the treaty.
146
Russia applied the ECT provisionally until
announcing on August 20, 2009 that the country would officially
not become a full participant in the ECT, choosing to never ratify
it and ending the provisional application with effect from Octo-
ber 19, 2009.
147
This is possible through Article 45(3)(a) of the
ECT.
148
Russia continued to participate actively in the meetings
139. See generally Belz, supra note 12, at 750.
140. ECT, supra note 103, art. 45.
141. Australia, Belarus, Iceland, and Norway also did not ratify the ECT.
Energy Charter Treaty: Signatories / Contracting Parties, INT’L ENERGY
CHARTER, http://www.energycharter.org/process/energy-charter-treaty-
1994/energy-charter-treaty/signatories-contracting-parties/ (last updated Feb.
18, 2019).
142. Id.
143. Belz, supra note 12, at 734.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 736, 737 (Australia, Iceland and Norway filed declarations at sig-
nature that they would not provisionally apply the ECT in accordance with
Article 45(2)).
146. Id. at 738 (Aus., Ice., and Norway did).
147. Graham Coop, 20 Years of the Energy Charter Treaty, 29 ICSID REV. ²
FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 515, 520 (2014).
148. Belz, supra note 12, at 737; ECT, supra note 103, art. 45(3)(a).
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and activities surrounding the ECT, making clear that it had not
completely rejected the substance of the Treaty.
149
One year
later, in September 2010, Russia released the Draft Convention
on Ensuring International Energy Security, which some refer to
as “ECT-Lite.”
150
This Convention removed the provisions that
Russia had often complained about, including the clause consid-
ered ¶anti-Gazprom’
151
and Article 7(3) of the ECT, which re-
quires equal treatment of domestic and international materials
for tariffs.
152
Russia’s readiness to leave its obligations under the ECT and
to adopt policies it deems more favorable to its institutions does
not prevent the country from continuing to be held accountable
through provisions of the ECT. Upon termination of the provi-
sional application, a former signatory of the ECT is obligated to
apply Part III (Investment Promotion and Protection) and Part
V (Dispute Resolution) with respect to investments made during
their time under the provisional application for twenty years fol-
lowing the effective date of termination.
153
This obligates Russia
to apply Parts III and V of the Treaty until October 19, 2029.
Retroactive interpretation of the Treaty, however, could allow
Russia to escape any liability surrounding actions taken during
the provisional application of the Treaty. Upon the tribunal’s in-
terpretation in Kardassopoulos v. Georgia,
154
other tribunals
149. Coop, supra note 147.
150. Id.
151. Gazprom is the largest gas company in Russia and the world. While the
company is privately owned it often draws criticism as being a source of con-
tention between Russia and the World. Gazprom has a reputation as a bully
and often Russia will reinforce high prices by the giant assisting in gas shut
offs and other activities. Inside the Global Giants: Gazprom – TheWorld’s Larg-
est Gas Company, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/specials/151_glob-
algiants/page4.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
152. Coop, supra note 147.
153. Belz, supra note 12, at 737²38.
154. Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs initiated arbitration proceed-
ings against Georgia in 2005 and 2007, respectively. They claimed that the
Georgian government had failed to provide compensation for losses sustained
after the government’s termination of the rights to operate, maintain and con-
struct pipelines and refineries and to export oil and gas. Belz, supra note 12,
at 739. This came as the Georgian government chose to establish a new state-
owned oil corporation in order to work with Azerbaijan to develop the oil in-
dustry on a larger scale. Id. The tribunal, using the ECT, found that the Geor-
gian government had taken actions that constituted a direct expropriation of
Mr. Kardassopoulos’ interest in the gas investment program. Id. at 738. Maria
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must analyze a state’s domestic law to determine if it is con-
sistent with the provisional application despite acceptance upon
signature.
155
Under Article 45(1) of the ECT, “Each signatory
agrees to apply this Treaty provisionally pending its entry into
force for such signatory . . . to the extent that such provisional
application is not inconsistent with its constitution, laws or reg-
ulations.”
156
Should a treaty be inconsistent with the domestic
law of a signatory, regardless of a state’s agreement to apply the
treaty provisionally, it will not apply.
157
This weakens the rule
of law overall, as well as the primary purpose of the ECT, be-
cause it allows states to later claim that their obligations were
in contravention with domestic law.
158
To further analyze Russia’s ability to be bound, the VCLT au-
thorizes a look at subsequent practices of the party.
159
This pre-
sents problems to Georgia if Russia were to intervene in the op-
eration of the Baku-Supsa Pipeline through its occupation of
South Ossetia.
160
Russia has continually shut off oil and gas sup-
plies to Europe in order to force European nations to comply with
its tax proposals or any other political objectives it seeks to
achieve, thereby not complying with the main objective of the
Treaty through Article 10(1).
161
Most notably, Russia cut gas
supplies to Ukraine in 2006 after the latter refused to agree to a
400 percent increase in the price of natural gas.
162
The shutoff
lasted four days and had effects throughout the rest of South-
eastern Europe.
163
Russia repeated this in 2009 and again in
Kostytska, Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v. The Republic of Georgia
(ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 and ARB/07/15) Award, International Arbitra-
tion Case Law (Oct. 2011), WINSTON & STRAWN, LLP, https://www.win-
ston.com/images/content/9/8/v2/986/Kostytska1.pdf.
155. Belz, supra note 12, at 745.
156. ECT, supra note 103, art. 45(1).
157. Id.
158. Belz, supra note 12, at 745.
159. Id. at 746.
160. See id.
161. Article 10(1) reads: “shall also enjoy the most constant protection and
security and no contracting party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or
discriminatory measures their management, maintenance, use enjoyment or
disposal.” ECT, supra note 103, art. 10(1).
162. Daniel Doty, Crushing Europe’s Pipeline Dreams: Russia’s Mineral Mo-
nopoly, Weakness in the Euro. Energy Market, and Realism in the Future, 37
WM. &MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’YREV. 759, 769 (2013).
163. Doty, supra note 162, at 769²70.
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2015 and will likely continue the practice in order to preserve
high prices and its political agenda.
164
III. YUKOS AND THE APPLICATION OF THE ECT
Yukos was not the first case utilizing the ECT in arbitration
proceedings; however, it was the largest arbitration award in
history under the Treaty.
165
An appeal to the Hague District
Court’s reversal of the award is pending, leaving the provisional
application of the ECT as an open-ended question with an un-
certain answer.
166
A. The Yukos Cases and the Threat to the Provisional Applica-
tion
Three separate shareholders of the now defunct Yukos Oil
Company were successful in 2014, winning the largest arbitra-
tion award in history under the ECT.
167
The victory was short-
lived as Russia filed in the Hague District Court three Writ of
Summons, which sought to set aside the awards, as well as chal-
lenge the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to hear the cases.
168
Russia argued that the tribunal had no jurisdiction due to the
lack of a valid arbitration agreement, despite the tribunal’s de-
termination that it held jurisdiction through the ECT.
169
Russia,
as only a signatory to the ECT, was subject to the provisional
application of the Treaty.
170
The Hague District Court’s ap-
proach to the provisional application of the ECT entailed a piece-
meal approach, meaning that the tribunal could examine Rus-
sia’s domestic law to determine if such laws were consistent with
one clause of the ECT³in this case, the arbitration clause.
171
The Court also looked at whether international investment ar-
bitration and methods of dispute resolution were authorized in
Russian law to determine if they were irreconcilable with the
points and principles laid out in Russian legislation.
172
The
Court ultimately found that because Russia had never ratified
164. See id. at 770.
165. Goldhaber, supra note 111.
166. Id.
167. Id. The Yukos Cases, supra note 110, at 76.
168. The Yukos Cases, supra note 110, at 76.
169. Id. at 77.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 78
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the ECT, it was only bound by the provisions that complied with
Russian national law.
173
The Court determined this through a
fragmented approach hinging on constitutional limitations of
Russia that did not allow for treaties deviating from Russia’s na-
tional law to be applied based merely on their signature; rather
they had to be ratified.
174
This determination was in spite of Ar-
ticle 25 of the VCLT, which provides the legal basis for provi-
sional applications.
175
This clause, though, is amorphous and has
not been applied consistently except to acknowledge that while
there is an obligation to refrain from acts that would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty, it does not create a positive legal
duty upon a signatory to do certain acts or to carry out specific
provisions from a particular treaty.
176
The decision by the tribunal in Yukos creates a problem for
arbitrations going forward under the ECT and arbitrations in
general.
177
The ruling exposes holes in the provisional applica-
tion of the ECT, particularly for those nations that have not rat-
ified the Treaty.
178
This loophole created by the tribunal allows
nations to escape obligations under the ECT simply by not rati-
fying the Treaty, while still retaining all benefits accorded dur-
ing their time as provisional applicants.
179
This undermines the
exact object and purpose of the Treaty³to create a level playing
field³and may, upon further examination on appeal, be over-
turned.
180
The political and economic significance of Yukos en-
sures that the case will continue to be examined and that the
tribunal for the case will continue to clarify and shape the use of
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 79.
176. Id. at 78.
177. Ben Knowles & Khaled Moyeed, The US$50 Billion Yukos Award Over-
turned – Enforcement Becomes a Game of Russian Roulette, WOLTERSKLUWER:
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (May 13, 2016), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitra-
tion.com/2016/05/13/the-us50-billion-yukos-award-overturned-enforcement-
becomes-a-game-of-russian-roulette/.
178. The Yukos Cases, supra note 110, at 85. This primarily applies only to
Belarus and Russia as Australia, Norway, and Iceland all made declarations
that they were not going to apply the treaty provisionally which was allowed
under the treaty. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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provisional application clauses holding signatories accounta-
ble.
181
This is good news for Georgia, which seeks to capitalize
on the ability to hold Russia accountable for actions taken in
contravention to the Treaty.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Support for Georgia’s ongoing conflict with Russia dwindles
when confronted with armed interference by Russia. It is
through the strength of a strong relationship with Europe and a
continued expansion in relations with the West that Georgia
may be able to regain autonomy and continue to prosper.
A. Expanded European Union Relations
Georgia currently shares a prosperous relationship with the
European Union, deepening their trade relationship by estab-
lishing a DCFTA and signing an association agreement that
went into force on July 1, 2016.
182
The European Union contin-
ues to affirm its support for Georgia in the wake of the Five-Day
War and states that it is committed to helping Georgia “over-
come the consequences of internal conflicts in Georgia’s breaka-
way regions. . . .”
183
While the European Union Monitoring Mis-
sion (EUMM) and the other initiatives put in place by the Euro-
pean Union are important and necessary to Georgia’s success, it
is not enough. The socioeconomic development of Georgia can
contribute to success in the region, but does not prohibit or deter
Russia from continually creeping further into the country as it
seeks to expand the territory of South Ossetia.
184
European Union involvement on the ground in Georgia has not
been evident, despite Georgia’s own commitment to peacekeep-
ing that contributes to the European Union’s Common Security
and Defense Policy operations.
185
The EUMM’s work patrolling
the areas adjacent to the boundary line is simply not effective,
and is likely overpowered by the military power displayed by
181. Id.
182. EU-Georgia Relations – Factsheet, EUR. UNION EXTERNAL ACTION (Oct.
11, 2017), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homep-
age_en/23634/EU-Georgia%20relations,%20factsheet.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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Russia on the other side of the boundary.
186
As Georgia contin-
ues to expand its trade with the European Union, particularly
through the sale of gas passing through its pipelines, the portion
of the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline under Russia’s control becomes
even more critical to protect.
187
While the European Union con-
tinues to assert support and attempts to foster engagement be-
tween regions based on a human rights approach, this human
rights-based approach ignores the potential for an economic
downfall in the region.
188
The border within Georgia, supported
by Russia’s “creeping annexation,” has moved just five hundred
meters away from Georgia’s main highway, threatening all as-
pects of economic success in the region.
189
The European Union’s
financial contributions have made a difference in Georgia’s abil-
ity to develop economically. These contributions have raised the
income of Georgian farmers, provided proper access to justice
through the establishment of a Government Legal Aid Service,
established regional development programs, and ensured trans-
parent finances for the Georgian Government. Due to Russia’s
movement into Georgia, this all is at risk.
190
Furthermore, the
European Union has helped to establish further mobility for cit-
izens and pushed Georgia to adopt its higher export standard
requirements.
191
B. Enhanced Military Response to Russia’s Aggression
Russia’s current approach to gaining territory has not yet led
to a military outbreak of any substantive proportions since the
Five-Day War. Russia did not, however, fulfill its commitment
to the Six-Point Cease-Fire Agreement (“Sarkozy Plan”) estab-
lished after the war and has subsequently not been held account-
able for not complying with the points in the agreement.
192
The
six points of the Sarkozy Plan³”renouncing force, ending hostil-
ities, letting in humanitarian aid, withdrawing both armies in
initial positions, and putting Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the
186. Id.
187. EU Warning over Land Grab, supra note 17.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. EU-Georgia Relations – Factsheet, supra note 182.
191. Id.
192. Renewed Confrontation in Georgia, supra note 109.
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international agenda”
193
³were deemed to be sufficient in calm-
ing the aggression and preventing a full destruction of Geor-
gia.
194
Georgia was forced to retreat and back down from its con-
flict with Russia after 2008, as Europe held the former state ac-
countable for its irresponsibility at the border, closing doors to
closer a European partnership with Georgia.
195
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine should serve as a guide for
what could happen in Georgia if no additional military help is
offered to Georgia.
196
Without the military assistance of a Euro-
pean Union nation or NATO, Georgians would face usurpation
of their nation by Russia.
197
The problem currently existing in
bridging this approach is Georgia’s lack of strategic importance
to nations other than Russia.
198
Russia sees Georgia as a nation
that currently allows Europe to seek oil and gas resources out-
side of its own state-controlled energy empire, thus taking away
bargaining chips Russia has used to keep prices high.
199
Europe,
however, does not receive enough of its gas supply from pipelines
in Georgia for the threat of a Russian takeover to produce a Eu-
ropeanmilitary response.
200
Furthermore, the United States has
dropped much of its diplomatic activity in Georgia since the war,
preferring not to intervene when it is militarily involved else-
where.
201
If the United States continues to disengage from Euro-
pean conflicts, it could allow Russia to exploit what the latter
could see as a weakness on the part of the West³an abandoned
Georgia.
202
The Council on Foreign Relations suggested in early
2016 that it was in the United States’ best interest to maintain
robust political support for Georgia in order to maintain a strong
position against Russian aggression in the region.
203
While Rus-
sian President Vladimir Putin continues to exploit weaknesses,
he responds to showings of strength by other nations and the
193. RAYFIELD, supra note 2, at 398
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Renewed Confrontation in Georgia, supra note 109.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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204
While Russia seemed to believe the Obama ad-
ministration would have acted more forcefully in Georgia than
it did during the crisis in Ukraine, it is unforeseen how the cur-
rent Trump administration would react.
205
The United States
could assist Georgia substantially through a greater NATO pres-
ence and U.S. military aid’s boosting Black Sea security, but this
does not appear to be on the current priority list of the Trump
administration.
206
CONCLUSION
Russia’s continued path of aggression in energy trade threat-
ens Georgia’s economic and territorial security. While the op-
tions available to Georgia that do not include armed conflict are
few, the opportunity to utilize the ECT to remove Russia from
the region due to interference with investments in Georgia is
possible. Through balanced diplomatic efforts, Georgia can find
a path to economic prosperity.
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